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Although the language of "spiritual sensation" are fOillld throughout 
the writings of Jolm Wesley, interpreters of Wesley prior to the late 20th 
century did not give much attention to the topic. Recent scholarship, however, 
has begun to delve into the issue, and the literature has raised a number of 
questions regarding the relationship between Wesley's empiricism and his 
use of the language of the senses in describing the experience of the Spirit. 
Are his references to the spiritual senses a modification of empiricism, or do 
they reflect other influences from Christian tradition? Does his theological 
epistemology comport with his natural epistemology, or is there an incoherence 
in his thought? 
In attempting to establish the coherence of Wesley's epistemological vision, 
many have focused on tracing the lineage of the language of spiritual sensation. 
Mark Mealey, in his 2006 doctoral dissertation, has provided a helpful discussion 
of the language of spiritual sensation in ancient and modern sources. 1 The 
language, strange as it may seem to us in the twenty-first century, was in wide 
use in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and can be found in sources 
as diverse as the Cambridge Platonists, Francis Hutcheson, and various 
advocates of the "religion of the heart" from pietist, puritan, and Catholic 
traditions, such as Zinzendorf, Arndt, Edwards, and Pascal. 2 Wesley of course, 
was certainly familiar with these sources. 3 The question as to where Wesley fits 
in relation to the modern and pre-modem traditions of spiritual sensation, 
Mealey notes, has normally elicited one of two answers: it is either a function 
of his empiricism, slightly modified, or it is an appropriation of Christian 
Platonism. 4 Mealey argues that the mistake in these interpretations is to view 
spiritual sensation as a philosophical category, whereas for Wesley it is "a 
strictly theological category," and should not be interpreted through either 
Lockean or Platonic lenses. 5 I will attempt to make a contribution to this 
question by engaging in a close reading of Wesley's 0\VIl espousal of 
empiricism, as well as his use of the language of the spiritual senses. I w1l1 
argue that Wesley, while committed to empiricism as a natural epistemology, 
views the experience of the Spirit as something which is kno\VIlintuitively.6 
He uses the language of spiritual senses as an analogy for this intuitively 
knO\VIl experience of the Spirit. \Xlhile Mealey is correct to argue that Wesley's 
talk of the spiritual senses is not an extension of his empiricism, I would 
suggest that he does, at tUnes, try to integrate his account of theological 
knowledge wi.th his empiricism. I w1l1 also address challenges that Wesley's 
use of the language of spiritual sensation poses for both the coherence and 
the adequacy of his theology. 
Wesley's Relationship to Locke and Browne 
J olm Wesley studied at Oxford during a time when J olmLocke's empiricist 
epistemology was gaining influence. 7 \Xlhile it is clear that the early Wesley was 
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influenced by Lockean epistemology, it seems that this influence came through 
secondary sources, such as Peter Bro\.VIle's The Procedure) Extent, and Limits 0/ 
Human Understanding, to be discussed shortly.s The mature Wesley provides 
us wi.th an explicit testimony to his vie\VS on Locke in his published Remarks 
upon Mr. Locke)s ((Essery On H uman Understanding,))9 Here Wesley speaks 
approvingly of Locke's foundational assertion that there are no irmate ideas,lO 
and affinns that Locke has firmly established that "all our ideas come from 
sensation or reflection." ll For Wesley, this excludes any suggestion of an 
innate notion of God "stamped on the soul," and so he clalins that "the 
little which we do know of Goo (except what we receive from by the inspiration 
of the Holy One,) we do not gather from any inward impression, but gradually 
acquire from wi.thout." 12 However, after affirming these fOlmdational 
principles fOillldin Locke's Essqy, Wesley goes on to provide a litany of errors 
and defects in the work Generally, these relate to what Wesley perceives to be 
Locke's "violent spleen against" and "total ignorance of"13 Aristotelian logic. 14 
After such statements it is somewhat surprising to find Wesley stating that 
none of the mistakes in Locke's Essqy are of any importance, and that "It 
might, therefore, be of admirable use to yOilllg students, if read with a 
judicious Tutor."15 In sum, Wesley agrees with Locke that the mind is a tabula 
rasa, and that the origin of all ideas is fOillld in sensation and reflection, but 
he views Locke's logic as inferior to standard Aristotelian logic. 16 
It is odd that Wesley's assessment of Locke's Essery passes over chapter 
nineteen of Book Four. This is Locke's treatment of the topic of enthusiasm, 
which he believes is fOillld "in all ages," whenever people have "flattered 
themselves wi.th a persuasion of an immediate intercourse wi.th the Deity, 
and frequent communications with the divine spirit."17 Locke believes that 
such claims to direct communication with God inevitably discoilllt reason 
and scripture in favour of "the conceits of a wanned or over-weening brain," 
which are taken to be illuminations from the Spirit, and are therefore followed 
and obeyed wi.th vigour, however odd or extravagant they may be.1s Locke 
dra\VS upon language of sensation in describing the invincible certainty of 
the enthusiasts: 
Reason is lost upon them, they are above it: they see the light 
infused into their illlderstandings, and carmot be mistaken; 
'tis clear and visible there; like the light of bright Silllshine, 
shows itself, and needs no other proof, but its 0\VIl evidence: 
they feel the hand of GOD moving wi.thin them, and the 
impulses of the spirit, and carmot be mistaken in what they 
feel ... what they have a sensible experience of admits no doubt, 
needs no reprobation ... \X1hen the spirit brings light into our 
minds, it dispels darkness. We see it, as we do that of the Silll 
at noon, and need not the tw1light of reason to show it us. 19 
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Locke is clearly skeptical of such claims to have an "awakened sense,"20 but in 
the end he allows that God may conununicate directly to humans, and that 
such internal "feelings" can be cOlmted true if they confonn to the external 
standards of reason and scripture. 21 
Wesley was always defending himself against the charge of enthusiasm, 
and so it is interesting to question the degree to which he might consider 
Locke to be a helpful advocate. Wesley would no doubt assert that he was not 
guilty of promoting enthusiasm in the sense of follO\ving after illlscriptural 
and illlreasonable guidance from the Holy Spirit. Indeed, akin to Locke, 
Wesley defines enthusiasm as a "religious madness arising from some falsely 
imagined influence or inspiration of God."n However, Wesley's 
illlderstanding of the Spirit's work goes well beyond anything Locke would 
support. \Xlhile Locke acknowledges that "GOD can, or doth sometimes 
enlighten men's minds ... by the immediate influence of the Holy Spirit,"23 
Wesley will make the sensible experience of the Spirit fOillldational to his 
soteriology, and therefore indispensable for anyone who would claim saving 
knowledge of God. Thus, while Wesley might claim that he is not 
inconsistent wi.th Locke's vie\VS on enthusiasm, we might expect that Locke 
would be tempted to label Wesleyan enthusiast of sorts. 
Wesley was less reserved in his esteem for the version of empiricism 
proposed in Peter Bro\VIle's The Procedure) Extent and Limits of Human 
Understanding. 24 Like Wesley, Bro\.VIle questions about Locke's logic/5 but 
affirms the two basic tenets of Locke's epistemology, nmnely that humans 
"are not furnished with any Innate Ideas of things material or immaterial,"26 
and that the senses are "the only Sourre and Inlets of those Ideas, which are 
the intire Groundwork of all our Knowledge both Human and Divine."27 It is 
in respect to the last part of this claim - that all our knowledge of God is built 
upon the five physical senses - that we will see Wesley departing radically from 
Bro\VIle. In outlining the way in which revelation is conununicated to us, 
Bro\.VIle writes: 
It is not reasonable to imagine that this should be performed 
by giving us any Faculties intirely New; or by any total Alteration 
of those we Alrea4Y have; for this would be a kind of Second 
Creation, and not any Information or Rewlation. 28 
No; Diune Infonnationgives us no New Faculties of Perception, 
but is adapted to those we Alrea4J have. 29 
The :Mind of Man ... hath no Dired Perception, or Immediate 
Consciousness beyond things sensible and human. 30 
Wesley, it is true, might find ways of reconciling what he is claiming about the 
experience of the Spirit with Bro\VIle's brand of empiricism. As was the case 
wi.th Locke, however, we might suspect that Bro\VIle would not wi.sh his 
views to be used to support some of the claims that Wesley is making. 
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Mealey is most definitely correct in emphatically rejecting any notion that 
Wesley's language of spiritual sensation is derived from Locke. 31 However, 
this does not mean that we should see no relation between his corrnnitment 
to empiricism and his use of the language of spiritual sensation. Although 
Wesley sees the experience of the Spirit as beyond explanation, his 
corrnnitments to empiricism do in fact influence the particular way in which 
he speaks of the spiritual senses, and the way he attempts to integrate his 
accOlmt of theological knowledge wi.th his empiricism. 
The Spirit, Spiritual Sensation and the Knowledge of God 
For Wesley, the Holy Spirit is, above all, God's gracious and empowering 
presence. 32 As the effectual and Personal presence of God, Wesley insists that 
the Spirit works immediately upon the human person. 33 It is in attempting 
to describe the reality of this immediate work that Wesley employs the language 
of the spiritual senses.34Moreover, Wesley speaks of the experience of spiritual 
sensation when addressing three distinct doctrines: faith, new birth, and 
assurance?5 I will proceed to give a general account of the language of spiritual 
sensation in Wesley and its relation to the knowledge of God, before 
addressing how spiritual sensation is related to faith, new birth, and assurance. 
One of Wesley's earliest and most detailed explanations of the spiritual 
senses comes in An Eamest Appeal to Men of Reason and Religion, written in 
1743. Here Wesley argues that, if anyone is to reason justly of "the things of 
God," he must make true judgments on the basis of clear apprehension, 
meaning "that your ideas thereof be allfixrd, distinct, and determinate."36 Further, 
because "our ideas are not irmate, but must all originally come from our 
senses, it is certainly necessary that you have senses capable of discerning 
objects of this kind."37 Further, because the natural senses are "altogether 
incapable" of discerning spiritual things, we must have "spiritual senses, 
exercised to discern spiritual good and evil."38 They are "a new class of senses 
opened in your soul," "avenues of the invisible world," which "furnish you 
wi.th ideas" which the physical senses are incapable of detecting. 39 It follows 
that one cannot have any apprehension of divine things until these "internal 
senses" have been "opened" by the Holy Spirit, because "the ideas of faith 
differ toto genere from those of external sensation."40 With the spiritual senses 
thus opened, "enlightened reason" is able to "explore 'even the deep things 
of God' God himself 'revealing them to you by his Spirit."' 41 Similar 
statements can be found in various places in Wesley's writings. 42 
So, Wesley believes that Goo and the things of Godmust be communicated 
by means other than the physical senses, and he uses the language of spiritual 
sensation in describing God's self-communication to individual human 
beings.43 But what exactly does Wesley intend by his use of the language of 
spiritual sensation? \Xlhen he is pressed, it becomes clear that Wesley is drawing 
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on his empirical accOlmt of natural knowledge as an analogy to describe 
something which he considers to be beyond explanation. \Xlhile strongly 
asserting the realiry of God's communication to humans in the experience of 
the Spirit, Wesley is reticent to attempt any explanation of the manner of s"OCh 
communication. The analogy of the physical senses is simply the besthe can offer. 
This is clear in A Farther A ppeal to Men of Reason and Religion (1746), when 
Wesley offers a response to a tract \V:Ii.tten against hlln by Thomas Dockwray, 
entitled, T he Operations of the H olY Spirit Imperceptible) and H ow Men mqy Know 
when thry are under the Guidance and Influe nce of the Spirit. 44 In answer to 
Dockwray's charge that "the operations of the Spirit are not subject to any 
sensible feelings;' Wesley\V:Ii.tes, "By 'feeling' I mean being inwardly conscious 
of. By 'the operations of the Spirit', I do not mean the manner in which he 
operates, but the graces which he operates in a Christian.,,45 Wesley later clarifies 
that it is by "figure of speech" that "we are said to feel this peace and joy and 
love; that is, we have an inward experience of them, which we carmot find any 
fitter word to express." 46 We find similar qualifications being made in other 
WTitings by Wesley from the mid-1740s onward. We can sense the frustration 
in Wesley as he WTites, in 1760, that he is speaking, 
Not in a gross, carnal sense, as the men of the world stupidly 
and willfully misunderstand the expression; though they have 
been told again and again, we mean thereby neither more nor 
less than this: He feels, is inwardly sensible of, the graces which 
the Spirit of God works in his heart.47 
So also, in 1790, he speaks of the language of "taste," "sight," and "feeling" 
as "figurative expressions."48 
Clearly, Wesley is not proposing an actual set of faculties, to augment the 
physical senses. His above explanations which drew close parallels between 
the physical senses and the spiritual senses are analogies, which he is employing 
to describe the theological reality of the Spirit's presence. Wesley simply wants 
to claim that, somehow, the Spirit is directly experienced, and the human 
being who has experienced the Spirit has definite knowledge of it: 
... suppose God were now to speak to any soul, "Thy sins are 
forgiven thee,"-he must be w1lling that soul should know 
his voice; otherwise he would speak in vain. And he is able to 
effect this; for, whenever he w1lls , to do is present with him. 
And he does effect it: That soul is absolutely assured, " this 
voice is the voice of God." But yet he who hath that witness in 
himself, carmot explain it to one who hath it not: N or indeed 
is it to be expected that he should.49 
Wesley carmot but affirm that God wills to "speak" his promises to his adopted 
children, and that what God has willed, must be so. Still, given his adherence to 
the sense-origin of all ideas, he has no way to explain how he kno\VS it. 
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In the end, Wesley's claim is that the knowledge of the experience of the 
Spirit is intuitive. There is an "inherent, essential difference" between the 
"light wherewi.th the Silll of righteousness shines upon our heart" and our 
0\.VIl presumption of the Spirit, and that difference "is immediately and 
directly perceived, if our spiritual senses are rightly disposed."50 Such basic 
truths are knO\.VIl, not as the conclusion to an argwnent, but simply and 
immediately, as surely as we know the difference between light and darkness. 
Of course, by presenting the spiritual senses in this way, and holding that 
those who do not have an awakened spiritual sensorium are unable to 
illlderstand the phenomenon, he presents an invincible logic, just the kind 
of argument that Locke was criticizing as enthusiasm.51 Indeed, late in life 
Wesley acknowledges to his faithful readers that this is the inevitable reality of 
their situation: 
... when you speak your experience, they immediately cry out, 
"Much religion hath made thee mad." And all that you 
experience, either of the invisible or of the eternal world, they 
suppose to be only the waking dreams of a heated imagination. 
It carmot be othenvise, when men born blind take upon them 
to reason concerning light and colours. They \Vil.l readily 
pronounce those to be insane who affirm the existence of 
those things whereof they have no conception. 52 
Wesley, of course, would insist that what the Spirit communicates to the 
bdiever is neither unreasonable nor unscriptural, and as we will see, he does leave 
room for rational reflection as a secondaryconfinnation of the Spirit's presence. 
To swrunarize, Wesley employs the language of spiritual sensation in 
order to describe the reality of the inward experience of God and the things 
of God, an experience he acknowledges to be beyond explanation. Those 
who have not experienced the Spirit cannot understand this reality. This 
general sketch of spiritual sensation can be filled out and clarified through an 
examination of Wesley's use of this vocabulary in relation to three of his key 
soteriological concepts: faith, the "new birth," and the "witness of the Spirit." 
Spiritual Sensation as Faith, New Birth, and Assurance 
Throughout his career, Wesley increasingly came to identify faith wi.th a 
spiritual experience, expressed in the language of the spiritual senses. A line 
of development in his thought can be traced, in which he begins wi.th a 
standard Protestant illlderstanding of faith and moves increasingly toward a 
description of faith as a spiritual experience. Particularly in the early Oxford 
sermons, we find Wesley employing the Reformation illlderstandingof faith 
as fiducia) a sure trust and confidence in the pro me of the gospel. 53 However, 
by 1744, Wesley is introducing what will become his key term for faith: elenchos, 
which he usually translates "evidence.,,54This experiential definition of faith, 
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based on HebreW'S 11: 1, is of a "divine, supernatural elenchos, evidence or 
conviction, "of things not seen," not discoverable by our bodily senses, as 
being either past, present, or future: It is a spiritual sight of God and the 
things of God.,,55 Since the elenchos is not discoverable by the bodily senses, 
it is described in the language of spiritual senses. Faith, as a supernatural 
elenchos, is '''-vith regard to the spiritual world, what sense is \.Vith regard to the 
natural."56 The Spirit overcomes the limits of natural human illlderstanding 
by imparting this divine evidence. "It is where sense can be of no farther use, 
that faith comes in to our help; it is the grand desideratum; it does what none 
of the senses can; no, not wi.th all the helps that art hath invented."57 Of 
course Wesley never contradicts the traditional Protestant illlderstanding of 
faith as sure trust and confidence in the merits of Christ, however, he tends 
to place increasing emphasis on the divine elenchos as the essence of faith. 5.3 
This experience of the Spirit as a divine conviction is accompanied, in 
Wesley's via saiutis, by the "new birth," which, as it relates to the language of 
spiritual senses, denotes a radical opening of the capacities for spiritual 
sensation. 59 Faith and the new birth are distinguished logically, but not 
temporally by Wesley, such the new birth takes place contemporaneouslywi.th 
the first instance of faith, though new birth is the consequence of faith. 60 He 
often describes the new birth as the awakening of the spiritual senses.61 The 
new birth involves a "twofold operation" of the Holy Spirit,62 the opening 
and the enlightening of the spiritual senses, so that God and the things of 
God can be discerned. 63 In the new birth, for Wesley, the spiritual senses are 
opened and awakened, such that the believer is empowered for growth in 
holiness as she continues in the life of faith. 
We also find Wesley using the language of spiritual sensation in cormection 
wi.th his doctrine of the "\.Vitness of the Spirit." As is well knO\VIl, Wesley 
posits that there are two wi.tnesses to our adoption in Christ, nmnely the 
indirect \.Vitness of our spirit, and the direct wi.tness of the Holy Spirit. The 
\.Vitness of our spirit is rational and experiential, because it is our reflection on 
the presence of the scriptural marks of Christianity, such as the fruit of the 
Spirit, in our lives. 64 Beyond this Wesley proposes that there is a "direct 
wi.tness" of the Holy Spirit, which he defines as "an inward impression on 
the soul, whereby the Spirit of God directly '\.Vitnesses to my spirit that I am 
a child of God'; that Jesus Christ hath loved me, and given himself for me; 
that all my sins are blotted out, and I, even I, mn reconciled to God."65 It is in 
cormection \.Vith the \.Vitness of the Spirit in particular that we see most clearly 
Wesley's reticence to answer the question of how the human being experiences 
the Spirit. So he confesses that "It is hard to find words in the language of 
men to explain 'the deep things of God.' Indeed there are none that \.Yill 
adequately express what the children of God experience.'''5-:) But the "fact" of 
this divine testimony, Wesley argues, is simply and indisputably knO\VIl by 
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the one who has received this wi.tness. 67 Again we have come to the problem 
of "invincible logic" and the question of enthusiasm. This will be discussed 
further below. 
I ssues of Coherence and Adequacy 
We now come to two questions of coherence. First, is Wesley's use of the 
language of spiritual senses soteriologically coherent? Mealey in raising these 
questions, notes that there are difficulties presented by Wesley's use of the 
language of spiritual senses and the relation between faith, new birth, and 
assurance.68 The relation between faith and the assurance of faith is problematic 
in that Wesley, particularly in the early years of the revival, implies that one 
carmot have saving faith without the full assurance of faith, excludingdoubt.69 
This created pastoral problems for Wesley, because it left many sincere people 
doubting their salvation on the basis of the fact that they had not experienced 
the witness of the Spirit in the dramatic way that Wesley depictedit. 70 
The solution which Wesley introduces later in his life is a distinction 
between the "faith of a servant" and the "faith of a son," both of which are 
granted to be justifying, but the latter of which is identified wi.th the fullness 
of Christian experience. The faith of a servant is the divine elenchos, a "divine 
conviction of God and of the things of God," which brings with it actual 
acceptance by God. 71 Wesley still proposes, that "unless the servants of God 
halt by the way, they w1l1 receive the adoption of sons,,,n that is, the direct 
wi.tness of the Spirit that they are a child of God. Further still, the mature 
Wesley distinguishes between the initial wi.tness of the Spirit, which might 
include some doubt, and the p lerophory, his transliterated term for "full 
assurance" of faith.73 Acknowledging the problems that were created by the 
early preaching of this doctrine,74 he believes he has fOillld a solution by 
acknowledging degrees of faith and degrees of assurance. 
Wesley will always maintain, however, that some measure of assurance is 
necessary.75 One carmot experience the Spirit, even in the initial event of the 
new birth and the awakening of faith, without knowingit. 76 This difficulty, 
of course, was raised in part because Wesley was using the same language -
that of spiritual sensation - to speak of faith, new birth, and assurance. If 
faith is the experiencing of a divine elenchos from the Spirit, and if this is 
accompanied by a new birth in which our spiritual senses are awakened so 
that such evidence can be discerned, it follo\VS that we must certainly have an 
exphcitawareness that this new birth has taken place. Since Wesley has framed faith 
as an evidence which is intuitively recognized, he carmot but insist that anyone 
having faith must be assured of the reality of Goo and the things of God. 
In spite of these potential difficulties, we can still vie\\'" Wesley's soteriological 
use of the language of spiritual senses as coherent if we give him a charitable 
reading. Though he speaks of faith, new birth, and assurance in the same 
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language, they can clearly be distinguished. Faith as spiritual sensation is, 
generally, the experience of God and the things of God, through the Spirit-
a theological reality best expressed by the analogy of the senses. The new 
birth as spiritual sensation is the Spirit's opening and enlightening of the 
capacity in the human being to discern the Spirit's presence and to continue 
into a deeper knowledge of God and the things of God in the life of holiness. 
Assurance is a particular spiritual experience whereby the Spirit gives a direct 
testimony to one's adoption as a child of God. In all three cases, as Mealey 
rightly notes, the factor that gives Wesley's use of this language coherence is 
the theological reality of God's presence in the life of the believer. 77 Wesley's 
use of this language is not aimed at explicating the distinctions between faith, 
new birth, and assurance, but is an analogical expression of the reality of 
salvation as the dynamic and living presence of God in the life of the believer. 
In this sense, also, his use of this language reminds us that Wesley views 
salvation in its entirety as an integrated whole, and not a series of distinct 
parts ("regeneration," "justification," etc.) which can be isolated and 
explained separately.78 
The second issue of coherence has to do wi.th the relationship between 
Wesley's intuitionist account of the knowledge of God and his empiricism. 
We have already seen that empiricists such as Locke and Bro\.VIle would not 
accept Wesley's account of intuitive theological knowledge. We have also seen 
that Wesley's use of the language of spiritual sensation is analogical and 
carmot be said to derive from his empiricism. However, I would argue that 
Wesley is, at times, attempting to integrate his claim to the intuitively knO\.VIl 
experience of the Spirit wi.th his empiricism. 79 \Xlhile he argues clearly that 
spiritual knowledge is not attainable by natural reason, he nevertheless suggests 
that the "ideas" perceived by spiritual sensation can be integrated with reason. 
The knowledge of God is based on intuitively apprehended graces, but we use 
our regular faculties of judgment and discourse in reasoning about these divinely 
apprehended realities. This is most evident in Wesley's acknowledgment of 
the fruit of the Spirit as secondary confirmation of the direct wi.tness of the 
Spirit, a move which grounds intuitive knowledge in scriptural revelation. so I 
would argue that this attempted integration of natural empiricism with an 
intuitively recognized experience of the Spirit is not incoherent, though it is 
unclear in places. For exmnple, what is the relation between the "ideas" that 
we have of God from the direct working of the Spirit and the ideas of God 
that we gain through our physical senses? In other words, how do the things 
we learn through our community of faith and our 0\.VIl study, which would 
seem to be "naturally" learned according to Wesley's scheme, integrate with 
our experience of the Spirit directly sensed? 
Finally, we must ask if Wesley's use of the language of the spiritual senses 
is theologically adequate. I would suggest that there are three significant 
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weaknesses in his use of this language, all arising from the individualistic 
character of his accOlmt of the Spirit's work. First, conceiving the Spirit as 
individually and intuitively recognized illldennines the role of the church. 
Because, for Wesley, the Spirit is individually experienced and intuitively knO\VIl, 
the community is left \Vith a diminished role in the process of discemingthe 
Spirit, and a weaker mandate for offering correction to its members. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that the various movements that have emerged from 
Methodism after Wesley have tended to have illlderdeveloped ecclesiologies. 81 
Secondly, Wesley's extensive use of the language of spiritual sensation also 
has potential to illldermine the importance of doctrinal content. Wesley 
himself was clearly rooted in the historic faith of the Church. However, his 
trans formative experience of the Spirit came after a high-church upbringing 
and an Oxford education, which enabled hlln to assume an orthodox theology 
of the Spirit. Most of his hearers did not have this groillldingin the historic 
faith, and so, many Methodist movements, as time went on, became 
increasingly rooted in experience, expressed either in terms of a liberal ethic of 
brotherly love, or a revivalistic fervor. Thirdly, Wesley's use of the language of 
spiritual sensation has the potential to be highly divisive. When the 
individually and intuitively discerned experience of the Spirit becomes a line 
of demarcation between the real Christians and the pretenders, this can lead 
to divisions ad infinitum, especially if the line of demarcation becomes an 
experience cut loose from the grOilllding of scripture, the historic faith of the 
Church, and the historic visible continuity of the Church itself. \X1hile some 
may feel that it is illlfair to evaluate Wesley's theology on the of developments 
that took place among later generations of Methodists, I would suggest that 
these developments highlight potential weaknesses that are already present in 
Wesley's pneumatology in its 0\VIl right. 
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and requires n o demonstration. Arndt's True Christianirywas included in the Christian 
Library, and is mentioned favourably by Wesley in "Reasons Against Separating 
fr om the Church of England," §I.lO, Rupert E Davies, ed., The Works 0/ John 
Wesi0'! Bicentennial Edition, v ol. 9 (Nashville : Abingdon Press,1989), 335. 
Subsequent referen ces to the Bicentennial Edition will simply be identified as 
Works. Wesley is known to have read Edwards, and abridged his Religwus Affections 
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in 1773; he quotes him as "That great man, President Edwards, of New England," 
in ''A Thought on Necessity," §§III.1-6; though he takes issue with him over 
predestination (see Thomas Jackson, ed., The Works 0/ John Weslry, 3rd ed. (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007), X: 475-476. On the other hand, there was also a rich 
tradition of spiritual sensation language in Christian antiquity, and it is well known 
that Wesley immersed himself in patristic literature. Wesley himself gives a list of 
patristic sources in defense of his claim that assurance is well compared to the 
blind receiving their sight: ''All this may be allowed concerning the primitive 
Fathers', I mean particularly Clemens Romanus, Ignatius, Poly carp, Justin Martyr, 
Iren::eus, Origen, Clemens Alexandrinus, Cyprian; to whom I would add Macarius 
and Ephraim Syrus." ''Letter to the Rev. Dr. Conyers lvllddleton," §V.II.11, Ibid., 
X: 79. The influence of Clement, Origen, Macarius, and Ephrem Syrus is noted in 
Theodore Runyon, The New Creation (Nashville: Abingdon, 1998), 74-75, and 
Mealey, Taste and See, 28. The theme is particularly prominent in Macarius, who 
Wesley included in his Christian Library and quoted in other contexts as well. See 
Sermon 43, "The Scripture Way of Salvation," §I.7, Works 2:159; Sermon 132, 
"On Laying the Foundation Stone of the New Chapel," §II.3, Works 3:586. H oo-
Jung Lee has argued that Macarius should be read as "the major patristic source" 
for Wesley's understanding of the experience of the Spirit. See ''Experiencing the 
Sp irit in Wesley and Macarius.," in Rethinking Weslrys Theology jor Contemporary 
M ethodism. (Nashville: Kingswood, 1998), 211. Mealey has also shown that Wesley, 
in his defense of the immediate sensible activity of the Spirit, draws on a broad 
range of patristic sources, including Chrysostom,Jerome, Athanasius, and Augustine. 
Mealey's suggestion is that such descriptions of spiritual experience were in fact 
what Wesley believed to be "characteristic of all the best Christian divinity of 
every age."Mealey, "Taste and See that the Lord is Good," 29. 
4 Ibid., 56. 
5 Ibid. This is the central claim of Mealey's dissertation. 
6 I use the term "intuitively" here in its colloquial sense, to mean something 
which is recognized immediately by the subject, without prior reflection or reasoning. 
I am not referencing any specific epistemological account of intuitive knowledge. 
7 lXlhile Aristotle remained the official standard at Oxford during Wesley's 
time, the private reading of tutors and students included Locke's Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding and the many works that sprung up in response to Locke's 
epistemology. Cf. Henry D. Rack, Reasonable Enthusiast: John Weslry and the Rise 0/ 
Methodism, 3rd ed. (London: Epworth Press, 2002), 386. Oxford was steeped in 
Aristotelian logical tradition, and students of Wesley's era were instructed on the 
basis of compendia of scholastic logic, such as Henry Aldrich's Rudiments of the 
Art of Logic. Wesley studied Aldrich, and continued to see his approach as 
normative, even as newer logics influenced by Locke, such as that of Watts, gained 
ascendancy. Ibid., 65. 
8 Wesley's study of Locke seems to have been indirect at first. He read a 
number of the responses to Locke in the mid 1720s, and the first indication we 
have of his actually reading the Essay itself is in 1732. Richard Brantley characterizes 
Wesley's engagement with Locke's essay at this time as "all but direct." Richard E. 
Brantley, l.L!cke, Weslg\ and the Method 0/ English R omantrum (Gainesville : University 
Presses of Florida, 1984), 29. Rack, indicates 1732 as the time when Wesley first 
read Locke's Essqy. Reasonable Enthusiast, 386. 
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9 Found in Works 0ackson) XIII: 455-464. 
10 It was, according to Wesley, an issue which was "at that time an utter 
paradox both in the philosophical and the religious world." Works 0ackson) XIII: 455. 
11 Works 0ackson) XIII: 456. 
12 Sermon 69, "The Imperfection of Human Knowledge," §I.4, Works 2: 571. 
13 Works 0ackson) XIII:462, 464. 
14 Showing his true colours as an Oxford man, Wesley remarks that "all the 
operations of the mind are more accurately divided by Aristotle than lAr. Lxke. 
They are three and no more: Simple apprehension, judgment, and discourse." 
Works 0ackson) XIII:456. For Wesley, this is the standard definition of reason as 
a faculty of the mind. Reason "means a faculty of the human soul; that faculty 
which exerts itself in three ways: by simple apprehension, by judgment, and by 
discourse. Simple apprehension is barely conceiving a thing in the mind, the first and 
most simple act of understanding. Judgment is the determining that the things 
before conceived either agree with or differ from each other. Discourse (strictly 
speaking) is the motion of progress of the mind from one judgment to another. 
The faculty of the soul which includes these three operations I here mean by the 
term reason." Sermon 70, "The Case of Reason Impartially Considered," §I.2, 
Works 2: 590. Elsewhere, Wesley comments, "It seems lAr. Locke only gives a new 
name to simple apprehension, terming it perception. Of judgment and reason, he 
speaks in the Fourth Book. Discerning, comparing, compounding, abstracting, are 
species of judgment. Retention, or memory, refers to them all." Remarks Upon Mr. 
uJCke's Works 0ackson) XIII: 456. 
15 Ibid., 464. Wesley was sincere in his endorsements, and made good on them 
by acting as "judicious Tutor" to his reading public, editing and publishing extracts 
of Locke's Essay in The Arminian Magazine between January 1782 and April 
1784. A table of reference listing all the portions of Locke's Essay which were 
extracted and published by Wesley is found in Brantley, Locke, Wesley, and the 
Method of English Romanticism, Appendix D, pp. 224--225. As we would expect 
from the above assessment, Wesley did not excerpt any material from Books III or IV 
16 Rack, Reasonable Enthusiast, 386. 
17 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (London: Thomas 
Basset, 1690), §IV19.5. Since Locke's work is available in numerous editions, I 
will cite section references, rather than page references. 
18 Ibid., §IV19.6-8. 
19 Ibid., §IV19. 8-9. Interestingly, Ronald Knox also includes the claim to new 
faculties as typical of enthusiasm: "The saved man has come out into a new order 
of being, with a new set of faculties which are proper to his state "Ronald A. 
Knox, Enthusiasm: A Chapter in the History 0/ Religwn with Special Reference to the XT/II 
and XVIII Centuries (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1994), 3. 
20 Locke, Essqy, §IV19.10. Wesley will speak of new birth as the awakening 
of the spiritual senses. 
" Ib,d., §IV19.14-16. 
n Sermon 37, "The Nature of Enthusiasm," §12, Works 2: 50. Late in life, 
and looking back on some of the failings of the Methodists, he describes excesses 
among them that cannot be called anything but enthusiasm, and uses language 
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similar to that found in Locke's Essqy: "[lvfethodismJ brought forth enthusiasm, 
imaginary inspiration, ascribing to the all-wise God all the wild, absurd, self-
inconsistent dreams of a heated imagination." Sermon 107, "On God's Vineyard," 
§V2, w",,0 3, 515. 
23 Locke, Essqy, §IV.19.16. 
24 Peter Browne, The Extent and Limits 0/ Human Understanding, 3rd 
ed. (London: R Innys & R Manby, 1737). Peter Browne, The Exten" 
and Limits 0/ Human Understanding, 3rd Edition (London: R Innys and R Manby, 
1737). Originally published in 1728, and revised in 1729 and 1737. The connection 
between Wesley and Browne is discussed at length by Brantley, Weslg\ and 
the Method 0/ English Romanticism, 29-47. See also Rack, Reasonable Enthusiast, 
386-387; Randy L. Maddox, Responsible Grace: John Wesl0')s Practical Theology 
(Nashville, Tenn.: Kingswood Books, 1994), 27-28; Frederick Dreyer, "Faith and 
Experience in the Thought of John Wesley," American Historical Review 88 (1983): 
25-26. Wesley received Browne's work with enthusiasm when it was published, 
and composed an abridgement of it in 1730, which he later published as an 
appendix to his compendium of natural philosophy, A Survry 0/ the Wisdom 0/ God 
in the Creation) or A Compendium 0/ Natural Philosophy, published originally in 1750 
(Brantley, l.L!cke) Wesl0') and the Method oj English Romanticism, 29; Maddox, 
Responsible Grace, 27.). The theological orientation of Browne's treatise undoubtedly 
attracted Wesley's attention, in part because one of Browne's stated aims was to 
counter the deists, whom he believed did n ot recognize the limits of reason. 
Browne was concerned to "lay a Foundation for the clear and effectual Confutation" 
of the errors of both enthusiasts and rationalists, "but especially those of the 
Arians, and Socinians, and Deists, and Free-thinkers of all Sorts." 
Exten" and Limits, 51. Irregularities in the use of capitals, italics, and occasionally 
in spelling, are reproduced as they are found in Browne. 
25 ''IXlhen the Ideas of Sensation and Reflection are first laid down indifferently 
for the Groundwork, then Men run endless Divisions upon them Tho' it be a 
Scheme as precarious and as void of any Foundation in Nature as Aristotle)s 
Predicaments, but much more perplexed and confounding; and thus they go on till 
their Heads are so filled and impregnated with them, that they turn everything into 
Ideas that comes in their way, insomuch that they can neither think nor speak 
without them." Ibid., 68--69. 
26 Ibid., 383. 
27 Ibid., 55. Browne is in some ways more extreme in his empiricism than 
Locke, chiding Locke for his indiscriminate use of the word "idea" to refer to 
ideas of both sensation and reflection. Browne argues that "the Word Idea, according 
to its genuine and proper Signification, should be limited and confined to our 
simple Sensations only, and to the various Alterations and Combinations of them 
by the pure Intellect." Ibid. , 63. Locke's use of "idea" was too imprecise for 
Browne's liking, as it seemed to imply ideas of reflection as independent sources 
of knowledge. "Thus the laying down the Ideas of Sensatron and Riflection to be 
..4like the Original Sources and Foundation of all our Knowledge, is one great and 
fundamental Error which runs thro' m ost of the Discourses and Essays of our 
m odern Writers of Logic and Metaphysics." Ibid., 64. The point is made repeatedly 
by Browne in various contexts throughout the treatise. Wesley is less bothered by 
Locke's use of "idea," though it is at times used improperly: ''filld why should any 
one be angry at his using the word "idea" for ''whatever is the object of the mind in 
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thinking?" Although, it is true, it is his favourite word, which he often thrusts in not 
so properly." Remarks upon Mr. uc.hls Essqy, in Works Qackson) XIII: 45:5. 
28 Ibid., 472. 
29 Ibid., 473. 
:10 Ibid., 477. 
:11 Mealey, "Taste and See that the Lord is Good," 55. He references Gerald 
Cragg's note on Wesley's Earnest Appeal to Men 0/ Reason and Religion, §32, in Works, 
HS7. 
:12 Randy Maddox helpfully summarizes Wesley's view of the Spirit by writing 
that he "equates the Holy Spirit with God's gracious empowering Presence, restored 
through Christ." Maddox, Responsible Grace, 119. Indeed, Wesley speaks of the 
Spirit as grace, which, though it sometimes means "unmerited mercy," may also 
refer to "that power of God the Holy Ghost, which "worketh in us both to will 
and to do of his good pleasure."" Sermon 12, "The Witness of Our OJrn Spirit," 
§15, Works 1:309. This is not to say, of course that the Spirit is a mere "power" or 
attribute of God. Doctrinally, Wesley holds to a orthodox Western concept of the 
Spirit. For example, see A Letter to a Roman Catholic, §8, "I believe the infinite and 
eternal Spirit of God, equal with the F ather and the Son, to be not only perfectly 
holy in himself, but the immediate cause of all holiness in us; enlightening our 
understandings, rectifYing our wills and affections, renewing our natures, uniting 
our persons to Christ, assuring us of the adoption of sons, leading us in our 
actions; purifYing and sanctifYing our souls and bodies, to a full and eternal enjoyment 
of God." Works Qackson) X:82. However, such foundational issues as eternal 
procession, Personhood, and divinity are beliefs which he assumes, and does not 
normally explicate. Hence Wesley's -writing on the Spirit is focused heavily on the 
Spirit's work in human beings. 
:l:l "But you thought I had meant "immediate inspiration." So I do, or I mean 
nothing at all. Not indeed such inspiration as is sine mediis. But all inspiration, 
though by means, is immediate." A Farther Appeal, §I.V.28, Works 11:171. 
:14 Mealy calculates at least three references to "spiritual sensation," fifteen 
references to "spiritual senses," four references to "spiritual sight," and one reference 
to "supernatural sight," "faculties capable of discerning things invisible," and 
"spiritual sense." Mealey, "Taste and See that the Lord is Good," 63--64. The 
references, range in date from An Earnest Appeal to Men oj Reason and Religion 
(1743) to Sermon 125, "On Living Without God" (1790). 
:15 I am indebted to Mealy for pointing out very clearly this threefold use of 
the language of spiritual sensation in Wesley. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 treat each of 
these doctrines in turn. Ibid., 104-288. 
:16 An Earnest Appeal to Men 0/ Reason and Religion §32, Works 11:56. 
:17 Ibid. 
:18 Ibid. 
:19 Ibid, Works 11:56-57. 
40 An Earnest Appeal, §§33-34; Works 11:57. 
41 An Earnest Appeal, §35, Works 11:57. 
42 The spiritual senses are spoken of as "inlets for the knowledge of spiritual 
things." Sermon 9, "The Spirit of Bondage and the Spirit of Adoption," §I.1, 
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Works 1:251; Charles Wesley also speaks of "inlets of spiritual knowledge," Sermon 
3, ''Awake, Thou that Sleepest," §I.11, Works 1: 146. They are also "faculties 
capable of discerning things invisible." ''A Letter to the Rev. Dr. Conyers 
lvlldclleton," §VI.II.9, Works 0ackson) X:74. If our "spiritual senses are all locked 
up," then we have "no true knowledge of the things of God." But when the 
spiritual senses are exercised, we are "daily increasing in the knowledge of God, of 
Jesus Christ whom he hath sent, and of all the things pertaining to his inward 
kingdom. "Sermon 45, "The New Birth," §II.4, Works 2:192-193. The physical 
senses, and therefore all natural reason, on which they are based, ''have nothing to 
do with the invisible world; they are not adapted to it." Sermon 119, 'Walking by 
Faith and Walking by Sight," §6, Works 4:50-51. Only when the Spirit has awakened 
the spiritual senses can the invisible world be grasped: "By this two-fold operation 
of the Holy Spirit, having the eyes of our soul both opened and enlightened, we 
see the things which the natural "eye hath not seen, neither the ear heard." We 
have a prospect of the invisible things of God; we see the spiritual world, which 
is all round about us, and yet no m ore discerned by our natural faculties than if it 
had no being: And we see the eternal world; piercing through the veil which hangs 
between time and eternity. Clouds and darkness then rest upon it no more, but we 
already see the glory which shall be revealed." Sermon 43, "The Scripture Way of 
Salvation," §II.l, Works 2: 161. 
43 We should note that Wesley clearly is not approaching the knowledge of 
God in Platonic categories. The knowledge of God given by the Spirit comes to us 
completely extra nos, and is not something which is somehow found within ourselves. 
Cpo John Smith," seek for God within your own soul, he is best discerned by 
an intellectual touch of him." in Cambridge Platonist spirituality (New York: Paulist 
Press, 2004), 158. lXlhile this sounds similar to Wesley, Smith is suggesting that we 
use the soul sense that is in us; the knowledge of God comes for Smith from 
ascending by being conformed to God, whereas for Wesley it is more of a dramatic, 
revelatory event. 
44 A Farther Appeal to Men 0/ Reason and Religion) §I.Vl; Wesley does not name 
the author, but he is identified in the notes by Gerald Cragg. Works 11:139. 
45 A Farther Appeal, §I.V2, Works 11:140. 
4 6 A Farther Appeal, §I.V28, Works 11:171. 
47 Sermon 45, "The New Birth," §II.4, Works 2: 193. See also the last paragraph 
of his last written sermon, Sermon 122, "On Faith," §18, where he writes, 
hereby a new set of senses (so to speak) is opened in our souls "Works 4:200. 
48 Sermon 130, "On Living Without God," §11, Works 4:173. 
49 Sermon 10, "The Witness of the Spirit - I," §II.11, Works 1:282-283. 
50 Sermon 10, "The Witness of the Spirit - I," §II.9, Works 1:282. 
51 Cf the quote from Locke, Essq, IV19.8-9, noted above. 
52 Sermon 119, "Walking by Sight and Walking by Faith," §19, Works 4:58. 
5:1 For example, in Sermon 1, "Salvation by Faith," preached at St. Mary's, 
Oxford, in June of 1738, Wesley defines faith as follows: "Christian faith is then 
not only an assent to the whole gospel of Christ, but also a full reliance on the 
blood of Christ, a trust in the merits of his life, death, and re surrection; a 
recumbency upon him as our atonement and our life, as given for us, and living in 
us. It is a sure confidence which a man hath in God, that through the merits of 
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Christ his sins are forgiven, and he reconciled to the favour of God; and in 
consequence hereof a closing with him and cleaving to him as our 'wisdom, 
righteousness, sanctification, and redemption' or, in one word, our salvation." 
Sermon 1, "Salvation by Faith," §I.5, Works 1:121. Also, Sermon 2, "The Almost 
Christian," also preached at St. Mary's, in July of 1741, §II.5, where Wesley quotes 
from the Homily on the Salvation of Man: "'The right and true Christian faith is' 
(to go on in the words of our own Church) 'not only to believe that Holy Scripture 
and the articles of our faith are true, but also to have a sure trust and confidence 
to be saved from everlasting danmation by Christ' ----cit is a 'sure trust and confidence' 
which a man hath in God 'that by the merits of Christ his sins are forgiven, and he 
reconciled to the favour of God'-'whereof doth follow a loving heart to obey 
his commandments.'" Works 1:139. 
54 Secondarily, "conviction." Sermon 4, "Scriptural Christianity," (his final 
Oxford sermon, preached August 24, 1744) §1.2, Works 1:161. 
55 Sermon 5, ''Justification by Faith," §IV.2, Works 1:194. 
56 An Earnest Appeal, §6, Works 11:46. 
57 Sermon 119, "Walking by Faith and Walking by Sight," §12, Works 4:53. 
58 So, in "Justification by Faith," from 1746, we find Wesley moving 
immediately from a discussion of faith as divine evidence into quotations from the 
homilies on faith as "sure trust and confidence." §IV.2-3, Works 1:194-195; See 
also Sermon 18, "The Marks of the New Birth," §1.3, where the "sure trust and 
confidence" is described as "a disposition, which God hath "Wrought in the heart." 
Works 1:418-419. However, in the last decade of his life, Wesley addressed the 
topic of faith a number of times in published sermons, always speaking of faith as 
elenchos, and making no mention of the fiduciary aspect. See Sermon 106, "On 
Faith, Hebrews 11:6," 1788; Sermon 117, "On the Discoveries of Faith," 1788; 
Sermon 119, "Walking by Sight and Walking by Faith," 1788; and Sermon 122, 
"On Faith," 1791. In the sermon "On Faith, Hebrews 11:6," (1788), Wesley 
describes faith as "such a divine conviction of God, and the things of God, as even 
in its infant state, enables every one that possesses it to "fear God and work 
righteousness."" Sermon 106, "On Faith," §I.1O, Works 3:497. lXlhile Wesley 
maintains an "enabling" aspect of faith as divine evidence, it should be clear that 
this enabling does not include the capacity for faith itself, as if the elenchos was 
the facilitation of a "choice" to put on faith. The elenchos is a gift of God, and it 
is itself faith, meaning that faith also is a gift, not a human work enabled by the 
elenchos. In accordance with his understanding of the Spirit as the gracious and 
empowering presence of God, he conceives the experience of the divine elenchos 
as transformative. 
59 However, it should be noted that Wesley presupposes some initial degree of 
regeneration which precedes even faith. See the discussion in Maddox, Responsible 
Grace, 159. Some degree of restoration of the spiritual senses is necessary for the 
person to experience faith as a divine elenchus. The new birth, then, denotes the 
greater opening of these capacities following upon faith. 
60 So, as Mealey summarizes, "faith is prior in reality, but not in time, both to 
new birth and to justification, in the intial moment of Christian life. Mealey, 
"Taste and See that the Lord is Good," 173. 
61 Sometimes Wesley speaks as if these are latent abilities which are not 
functioning, as in the vivid image of a fetus in the womb: "he has eyes, but sees 
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not; he has ears, but does not hear, he has a very imperfect use of any other sense." 
Sermon 45, "The New Birth," §II.4, Works 2:192. Also, Sermon 9, ''The Spirit of 
Bondage and the Spirit of Adoption," §I.l:" his soul is in a deep sleep: His 
spiritual senses are not awake: They discern neither spiritual good nor evil. The 
eyes of his understanding are closed; they are sealed together, and see not." Works 
1:251. At other times, rather that speaking of the spiritual senses as somehow 
dormant, he speaks of them as absent "Ye have not received the Holy Ghost. Ye 
have no spiritual senses." Sermon 130, "On Living Without God," §15, Works 
4:175-176. Also An Earnest Appeal, §50: "There is no intercourse between your 
soul and God. ''You have neither seen him," (by faith, as our Lord witnessed 
against them of old time,) "nor heard his voice at any time." You have no spiritual 
"senses exercised to discern spiritual good and evil. "" Works 11:64. 
62 Sermon 43, "The Scripture Way of Salvation," §II.l, Works 2:161. 
63 " when he is born of God, born of the Spirit, how is the manner of his 
existence changed! His whole soul is now sensible of God, and he can say by sure 
experience, 'Thou art about my bed, and about my path'; I feel thee in 'all my 
ways'. 'Thou besettest me behind and before, and layest thy hand upon me.' The 
Spirit or breath of God is immediately inspired, breathed into the new-born soul; 
and the same breath which comes from, returns to God." Sermon 19, "The Great 
Privilege of Those Born of God," §I.8, Works 1:434. Multiple similar examples 
could be given. For example, Sermon 9, "The Spirit of Bondage and of Adoption," 
§III.2, "Then he sees (but not with eyes of flesh and blood) "The Lord, the Lmd 
God; merciful and gracious "Works 1:260-261. 
64 "Every man applying those scriptural marks to himself may know whether 
he is a child of God. Thus if he know, first, 'As many as are led by the Spirit of 
God' into all holy tempers and actions, 'they are the sons of God' (for which he 
has the infallible assurance of Holy Writ); secondly, I am thus'led by the Spirit of 
God'-hewill easily conclude, 'Therefore I a!ll a "son of God".'" Sermon 10, "The 
Witness of the Spirit - Discourse I" §I.2, Works 1:270. 
65 Sermon 10, "The Witness of the Spirit - Discourse I," §I.7; Works 1:274. 
The definition is repeated by Wesley in Sermon 11, "The Witness of the Spirit -
Discourse II," §II.2, which was "Written twenty-one years after the above quote 
(the dates are 1746 and 1767 respectively). Works 1:287. 
66 Sermon 10, "The Witness of the Spirit - Discourse I," §1.7, Works 1:274; 
also §I.12 "The manner how the divine testimony is manifested to the heart I do 
not take upon me to explain. 'Such knowledge is too wonderful and excellent for 
me; I cannot attain unto it.'" Works 1:276. 
67 "But the fact we know: namely, that the Spirit of God does give a believer 
such a testimony of his adoption that while it is present to the soul he can no more 
doubt the reality of his sonship than he can doubt of the shining of the sun while 
he stands in the full blaze of his bea!lls." Serm on 10, "The Witness of the Spirit -
Discourse I," §I.12, Works 1:276. 
68 Mealey, "Taste and See that the Lord is Good," 5-6. He returns to the 
question in his conclusion, pp. 291-294. 
69 For eXa!llple, Sermon 4, "Scriptural Christianity," §I.l, "By this faith of the 
operation of God, which was the very substance, or subsistence, of things hoped 
for, (I-Ieh xi. 1,) the demonstrative evidence of invisible things, he instantly received 
the Spirit of Adoption "Works 1:161. Wesley discusses faith and assurance 
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separately, suggesting on the one hand that faith is the only condition of 
justification, Sermon 5, ''Justification by Faith," §IV.1-6, Works 1:193-197. Yet at 
the same time he insists that no one can be justified without knowing it, and this 
can only come through the witness of adoption: ''A sinner is convinced by the Holy 
Ghost, "Christ loved me, and gave himself for me." This is that faith by which he 
is justified, or pardoned, the moment he receives it. Immediately the same Spirit 
bears witness, "Thou art pardoned; thou hast redemption in his blood." And this 
is saving faith, whereby the love of God is shed abroad in his heart." Q.5. Have all 
Christians this faith? May not a man be justified, and not know it? A. That all true 
Christians have such faith as implies an assurance of God's love, appears from 
Romans viii.15; Ephes. iv.32; 2 Cor. xiii.5; Heb. viii.lO; 1 John iv.lO, and 19." 
From ''lvlinutes of Some Late Conversations," 1744, Works Qackson) VIII:276. 
70 Thus, before long, Wesley was revising his position to make room for 
exceptions. Ibid., from 1745, "Q.l. Is a sense of God's pardoning love absolutely 
necessary to our being in his favour? Or may there be some exempt cases? A. We 
dare not say there are not. Q.2. Is it necessary to inward and outward holiness? A. 
We incline to think it is." Works Qackson) VIII:282. 
71 ''He actually is at that very moment in a state of acceptance. But he is at 
present only a servant of God, not properly a son. " Sermon 106, "On Faith, 
Hebrews 11:6" §I.lO, Works 3:497. 
72 Ibid., §I.12, Works 3:497. 
73 Even further still, he at times distinguishes the plerophory of faith and the 
plerophory of hope. For, example in ''A Letter to lArs. Ritchie," October 6, 1778: 
"The plerophory (or full assurance) of faith is such a divine testimony, that we are 
reconciled to God, as excludes all doubt and fear concerning it. This refers only to 
what is present. The plerophory (or full assurance) of hope is a divine testimony, 
that we shall endure to the end; or, more directly, that we shall enjoy God in glory. 
This is by no means essential to, or inseparable from, perfect love." Works Qackson) 
XIII:60-61. On the basis of this distinction, Arthur Yates distinguishes between 
four degrees of assurance: faith in general, assurance of adoption, full assurance 
of faith, and full assurance of hope. See The Doctrine of Assurance: With Special 
Reference to John Wesley (London: Epworth Press, 1952), 128-132. 
74 "Indeed nearly fifty years ago, when the preachers commonly called 
Methodists began to preach that grand scriptural doctrine, salvation by faith, they 
were not sufficiently apprised of the difference between a servant and a child of 
God. They did not clearly understand that even one 'who feared God, and worketh 
righteousness, is accepted of him.' In consequence of this they were apt to make 
sad the hearts of those whom God had not made sad. For they frequently asked 
those who feared God, 'Do you know that your sins are forgiven?' And upon their 
answering, 'No', immediately replied, 'Then you are a child of the devil.' No; that 
does not follow." Sermon 106, "On Faith, Hebrews 11:6," §I.11, Works 3:497. 
75 The point is well demonstrated by Kenneth]. Collins, The Theology of 
John Wesley: Holy Love and the Shape of Grace (Nashville, ill: Abingdon Press, 
2007), 131-137. 
76 For example, "If Christ is not revealed in them, they are not yet Christian 
believers." "lvlinutes of Some Late Conversations," June 16, 1747, Works 
Qackson) VIII:293. 
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77 As Mealey summarizes in his conclusion: "The apparent incoherence of 
Wesley's soteriology comes into focus once we understand the experience of 
spiritual sensation realistically. This basic experience of God is the supernatural 
presence of God in the believer; this experience is nothing else but a direct contact 
with the life of God." Mealey, "Taste and See that the Lord is Good," 291. 
78 On this point, again, Maddox helpfully comments that, for the mature 
Wesley, the various aspects of salvation "were not an ordered series of discrete 
states," but "intertwined facets of an overarching purpose - our gradual recovery of 
the holiness that God has always intended for us." l:vfaddox, Responsible Grace, 158. 
79 In this I differ from Mealey, who asserts strongly that Wesley's use of the 
language of spiritual senses is "the exact antithesis of Lockean empiricism." Mealey, 
"Taste and See that the Lord is Good," 290. lXlhile I agree that we need to be 
careful not to read too much philosophy into Wesley's use of this language, I think 
Mealey has over-stated the case against considering the influence of empiricism on 
Wesley's use of the language. 
80 Here I think Wesley could have harmonized his views of spiritual knowledge 
with Locke's category of "intuitive knowledge," the apprehension of which Locke 
describes as "irresistible," and "immediately perceived," without any room for 
doubt. Locke, Essqy, §IV.II.1; 472. Similarly, Wesley is asserting the reality of an 
experience which is known "antecedently to any reflection upon our sincerity; yea, 
to any reasoning whatsoever." Sermon 11, "The Witness of the Spirit -Discourse 
II," §I1IA, W"k; U89. 
811Xlhile this is, of course, a rather broad generalization, the fact that Albert 
Outler could "Write an article titled, ''Do Methodists Have aDoctrine of the Church?" 
is a testimony to the general weakness of the Methodist ecclesiological tradition. 
See Albert C. Outler, ''Do Methodists Have a Doctrine of the Church?," in The 
Wesleyan Theological Heritage, ed. Thomas C. Oden and Leicester R Longden 
(Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1991), 211-226. 
